NETWORKED REVOLUTION: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt after 30 days

The revolution will not be televised. It is being networked and it is live. January  2011 has been a month of watching al-Jazeera’s English channel streamed live on the Internet and following Twitter #sidibouzid and #jan 25 as we watched first Tunisia and then Egypt undertake networked revolutions. This is a networked visuality that counters the realpolitik of the Cold War and its legacies in counterinsurgency. This post goes up one week into the Egyptian uprising that began on January 25, 2011 and one month into the North African revolution. It is 1989, it is 1956, it even recalls 1848. This time the spectre of revolution has returned with a difference. It is not a spectre hidden in Roman dress, behind a winding sheet, or in the battle armour worn by Hamlet’s father. It is live.

Complexes of Visuality

A parenthesis on visuality: In The Right to Look, I identify a series of what I call “complexes of visuality.”

Complexes of Visuality diagrammed

Let me quickly note some caveats: the dates are indicative not a hard “break”; no complex has disappeared but each has its hegemonic moment; and each complex has two modalities, its ordinary state and a later “intensified” form.

In the chapter that considers the transition from the intensified form of the imperial complex, namely fascism under the Carlyle-inspired Duce and Führer, to the military-industrial complex and its global counterinsurgency, I concentrate on Algeria as the metonym of such a transition. There are many “Algerias,” places at the interface of decolonization and globalization. Those contradictions are what we are now seeing working themselves out, challenging long-standing paradigms of power. I’ve built a multi-media exploration of this theme in the new Scalar software being developed by the Alliance for Networking Visual Culture at USC (I hope this will go live soon). It uses the model of a demonstration with feeder marches and detours to explore the place of “Algeria” in what I hope is a comprehensible but non-linear form.

The street actions that began in Algeria and have spread first to Tunisia and now Egypt constitute a rather striking interface with the project, confirming my sense that it was only by considering visuality in its places of application as a technique of slavery and colonization that I could properly understand it. Now it seems that that places in which counterinsurgency was first applied, as visualized by Gillo Pontecorvo’s classic film The Battle of Algiers (1966), are making clear the possibility of a sustainable counter-counterinsurgency–which cannot be insurgency– that I am going to call “networked visuality.”

To a Networked Visuality?

Of course, it’s way too soon for conclusions. The protestors are still out in the streets in Tunisia and Egypt alike. In Tunisia, the dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali is gone but his shabby deputy remains as prime minister, although many of dictator’s old cronies have been driven out. On January 29, in a revolutionary journée to recall the street conflicts of the past, from the 1789 French Revolution to the October Revolution and 1968,

The battle for Cairo between the security police and the people

the Egyptian popular forces drove the militarized police force off the streets, burned their stations and the headquarters of Mubarak’s “party.” The dictatorship has played the reshuffle card that failed in Tunisia. It has more troops at its disposal but faces a larger, better connected populace. The whole world is still watching. Let’s be optimistic, in full realization of the realities and with every respect for the many dead and wounded in Egypt.

Whether or not the revolutions will have been fully successful–and no-one has really defined that success–there is a palpable and electric sense of change, not just in North Africa but globally. The events have revealed that there is already a network for change and how it has worked. One tweet widely circulating from Egypt outlined the method: “Facebook used to set the date, Twitter used to share logistics, YouTube to show the world, all to connect people.” The dispersed co-ordination shows that the network has learned from Iran that social networking can also be used by the police to track down activists. Mubarak tried to cut off all Internet access, hoping that this would quell the street actions. Facebook went first, followed by Twitter, then all connections. It was a revolution watched on social networks, but acted in the streets.

When the disconnect failed, Mubarak attempted to shut down al-Jazeera television on January 30 and the next day saw brief arrests of al-Jazeera staff and confiscation of their equipment. Security forces have been tweeting under aliases  to request information on the whereabouts of “missing” protestors–until one of the “missing” tweeted back that it was a scam. The place of media–old and new–in the networked revolution is being worked out as we go. Let’s be clear that these media themselves are not the revolution.

It’s perhaps already been forgotten that the first flickers of revolt failed because they so quickly succeeded. In Algeria, popular protests against price rises in basic foodstuffs were so vehement that the ruling FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), the fossilized remains of what was once a decolonial revolutionary party, backed down. In Tunisia and Egypt as well, it’s the fundamental decline in opportunities, combined with a nearly twenty per cent rise in food prices, that formed the possibility of a revolt. Neo-liberal capital has been able to constantly relocate its labor to lowest bidder since the end of the Cold War. It got complacent and assumed there was no longer any need to placate the dispossessed. But climate change is driving up the price of food and no amount of circus makes up for the lack of bread. Demonstrations returned to Algeria on January 29th.

One person has come to epitomize the network revolution. His name was Mohammed Bu’azizi, a twenty-six year-old fruit seller in Sidi Bouzid–it was widely said that he was a college graduate but this turned out not be the case. After a government official imposed a fine on him for selling without the required but impossible to obtain permit–and according to some versions, slapped him to boot–Bu’azizi went to protest. Dismissed by the bureaucrats, he stunningly immolated himself as a terminal insistence on his right to be seen. Demonstrations of support began in his locality, which were picked up by al-Jazeera and on Facebook. Over a month of rising militancy followed, for three weeks of which Bu’azizi remained alive with terrible burns. In Egypt this one person was Khaled Said, whose death at the hands of security police in June 2010, was caught on cell-phone video that subsequently went viral.

What We Can See Here

Soon after his death, a network of revolution was accomplished. It relies on a series of relays beginning with the embodied affirmation of the withdrawal of consent to be ruled in the streets, live. Next comes vernacular visual and textual reporting from those places; their distribution via social networks like Facebook and Twitter that also served as points of aggregation for information and resources; a broader dissemination via globalized cable television news that made the spectacular repression of the traditional colonial state impossible; and finally, corporate television and print media. Interspersed among all these were the “hacktivists” (combine hacker and activist), who came to media prominence with the Wikileaks disclosures, which gave clear evidence of the long-standing assertions that Egypt routinely uses torture and violently suppresses all dissent.

In an interview published January 30, Julian Assange interestingly argued, referencing an old Microsoft slogan, that: “We [Wikileaks] called their bluff regarding how much ‘universal connectivity’ the political system really wanted after the cold war.” The North African revolution is, in this view, part of a working out of the contradiction between Cold War rhetorics of the open society and democracy and its practices of secrecy and surveillance. Practical connectivity comes from groups like Anonymous, who set up ways for people in Egypt and Tunisia to get cell-phone and Internet access when their governments were trying to cut them off, and those distributing pamphlets via email on how to protest.

The result has been the now-characteristic “leaderless” revolutions, as the Western media have depicted them, as if expecting new Castros and Lenins to materialize. Unable to comprehend networked change, those working in hierarchical companies are already writing banal opinion pieces predicting the collapse of the revolutions for lack of the very kind of leadership that provoked the uprisings. Should the revolutions fail, it will be following the combination of local state violence and globalized governmental and corporate hostility. Israel and Saudi Arabia found an unusual point of agreement in opposing the Egyptian revolution, while stock markets plunged on January 29 as it became clear that the revolution was not going to be crushed. Oil prices hit $100 a barrel on January 31, the usual profiteering from democracy. Israel has begun leading a movement to support Mubarak for fear of the unknown.

By the end of the first week, Mubarak was playing the standard autocratic theme of “order” versus “anarchy,” using his security police to create disorder, while keeping the ordinary police off the streets. The revolutionaries formed a popular front with Mohammed el-Baredi as a figurehead. Their next tactics are the general strike, largely in effect on January 31, and the mass mobilization set for February 1 of the iconic “one million people.” The ability to mobilize such numbers may become a key test of the popular front strategy and the regime has responded first by closing the railways and  by calling a counterdemonstration of their loyalists and security forces. In anticipation, the army has declared that it will not open fire on the people.

What the networked revolutions have already demonstrated is that an alternative is possible. In Tunisia, a police state where there was one police officer for every forty people, Internet access was censored and television carefully controlled, no such event should have been possible. Certainly none of the traditional white men with cameras and hotel reservations, known as foreign correspondents, predicted it. With more than half its population under thirty but with little sense of opportunity and a long-standing autocracy, Tunisia is typical not only of the region but many countries in the global South. Quick confirmation of the viability of the Tunisian “model” elsewhere came from China where the ever-diligent web censors removed all mentions of Egypt from the Sina micro-blogging service, used by over 50 million people.

In an October 2010 interview with Jon Stewart, President Obama changed his slogan from “yes we can,” to “yes we can but…” as he succumbed to the right-wing backlash from the Tea Party. In 2011, the networked revolution has changed the terms. There will not be a transformatory leader but there can be transformation. So although I’m using the phrase “networked visuality,” what’s critical here is that we’ve moved beyond a visualization by a heroic leader to something else. The decisive and symbolic conflict in Cairo on January 29 was between the people and the police for the control of the Kasr-al Nil bridge. As I have been writing for years, following Rancière, the police say to us “move on, there’s nothing to see here.” Only there is, we know it and now we know how to get to see it.

The network is live, the revolution is live. The energy that causes the network to circulate stems from the great performative moments in the streets, but it can be intensified as it passes through the network, as it was when “Egypt” watched “Tunisia.” This is a performative watching that reverses the long-standing deployment of visuality as a weapon against civilian populations by the Psy-Ops brigades and the ranks of the secret police .

Who’s watching Egypt? What about you?Are you live? What’s your next link?

  12 Responses to “Networked Visuality: The Revolution in North Africa”

  1. Nick
    This is great, this is a very useful forum that you have created …. the question, tho, for me is how to move the folks here in the US who are watching the events in N.Africa to become part of that networked visuality as participant rather than consumers of a live drama.

    Here in the US, national talk shows (even) are reflecting an urge in sectors of American society to draw conclusions from what they are seeing in the streets of Tunis and Cairo. But the sense that resistance to the economic order only belongs elsewhere is being hammered by all media and doesn’t seem to be trickling past the plasma.

    My problem with looking at the amazing repercussions of the networked visuality of Iran and Egypt and Tunisia …. is that it still doesn’t break the barrier with idea that there are more similarities than differences between Muhammad Bu’azizi and the millions of folks here who are losing their homes, their jobs, their savings, their future.

    I wonder if the screen that carries that visuality does more to mystify than de-mystify that necessary identification with those folks who are coming together as a collectivity to DEMAND their fair share rather than elect the next “good” guy that will deliver that HOPE for them

    K

    • Kouross, I agree totally that this is a central question: don’t forget that visuality has always been their tool to keep us in line. It has often been countered in the direct fashion of the traditional battle–Marx’s two camps. What does the networked visuality offer as a means of more distributed response?

      • I am still not convinced that what is happening here is anything beyond the creation of an internet “revolution porn”
        the relationship between porn and reality, desire, subjectivity & visuality is, of course, quite complex… but the basic dynamic of us sitting here watching folks in Iran, Egypt, Burma, etc etc. as they battle their own ruling elite hasn’t been able to transcend that dynamic and I am not sure if we can expect it to

        • Kouross–visuality is not the same as what’s on the screen: visuality is the means by which power visualizes history to itself and claims to be the only force capable of so doing. Hence the repeated calls for “order,” recalling the Versailles repression of the Paris Commune by the Party of Order in 1871. In short, there is a real importance to setting aside the mantra of that power “move on, there’s nothing to see here.” What the place of those not involved in a moment of revolution but who can now “see” it should be will be the subject of the next post on this blog:)

  2. [...] Right to Look, Networked Visuality: The Revolution in North Africa,” has tracked the developments, theorizing the place of (old and new) media in these actions [...]

  3. [...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Khaled Hishma and Gabrielle Verdier, uberkazu. uberkazu said: 現在のエジプトに見られるネットワークと革命の関係について:http://nicholasmirzoeff.com/RTL/?p=32 [...]

  4. Orientalist image making by Mubarak’s repression:

    Consider the recent image making by the Egyptian state in its staging of counterinsurgency terror in mufti with the invasion of Liberation square in Cairo by thugs riding horses and camels, and by pedestrian vigilantes armed with home made swords. This is deliberate Orientalist theater and iconographies being orchestrated by the state to promote a picture of generalized anti- modern anarchy. These mounted and pedestrian thugs are being imported from nearby rural areas, released from prisons and recruited from security forces in civilian drag who are either paid by the state, or the National Party. (The mounted thugs are described by apologists of the state as disgruntled tour guides who give tourists rides on camels and horses protesting their loss of income. But why expose your horse and camel to harm and injury if these animals are a prime source of income?) The posture of the army with their tanks, armored cars and water hoses as the placid embodiment of modern techno-rationality is now clear–they are waiting for the democratic protests to devolve into street fighting before intervening to demobilize the democratic opposition. The major weakness of the protestors has been their belief that the military is essentially a populist institution; this faith will be betrayed as was already signaled by the jets that previously harried the protests.
    Addendum: My experience work in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and South Africa in the 1990s, has taught me in situations of popular political mobilization the repressive state forges alliances with local criminal networks.

    • Well observed, Allen. And it’s noteworthy that the Army and the Mubarak regime are using the same language of a return to “normality,” the temporality in which everyone knows their place and stays there. Which was exactly what the US administration called for in its mantra of “orderly transition,” meaning first, a return to “order” in which people are in their proper place and then a transition from one pro-US/Israel autocrat to another.

      • As Allen notes, this astutely-crafted Orientalist violence conjures grim déjà vu of the state-concocted “black-on-black” violence in the early 1990s in South Africa. The aim: photo-ready images of contradictory chaos that might morph/mix/split the mindset of the protesters/populace, placing the state in a good position to offer what is, after all, one of the aspirations of the resistance: peace, stability, decency, a new order, etc. [i.e.: we find here a strategic harnessing of the means/ends humanitarian principle; galvanizing thereby inertial forces around (sometimes legitimate) differences on the street.] This puts the seeming placidity of the army, no less than the PMs apologies this morning, etc., into perspective.

        As Nick notes, the tactic is as old as the hills. The question is – a technical question, at bottom: What tactics are available to protestors when this move is (inevitably) precipated by the state?

  5. Great post, great project Nick.

    “It was a revolution watched on social networks, but acted in the streets.”

    A short sentence, but it’s exactly that connection between watching (or filming, tweeting, etc) and material activity that is so rich here. To really grapple with that connection means moving beyond the silly Shirky vs. Gladwell debate and thinking through how we use these new media in articulating and acting out our politics, in at least two principle ways: 1) purely instrumentally: as tools to do better what we used to do with pamphlets and telephones, and 2) as models for social engagement and interaction, that is: objects-to-think-with (and probably lots of ways I haven’t considered). For me what’s really exciting in your post is your gesture towards what happens next: can the network model which has proven again and again so effective in protest be adapted and applied to the next stage: building a new world. If not, we’re back to always a resistance and never a revolution.

  6. This is an excellent blog, brilliant, I am glad to see the analysis of revolutionary practice being carried out historically. Seems to me though, that the question is not “are you live” but “are you alive”? By which I mean, can you move from watching to doing? That has been the problem in the hyper-mediated societies. You point out in an above answer that visuality has so far been “their” visuality, and it’s an important point. While the Western networked revolutions were unfolding (counter-globalization movements) I participated and wrote about them extensively, always saying that if things were happening, it was because of a relation between the message and the embodiment. Now I look at the Egyptian uprising and what I see is this relation, a complex one, crossing all the levels of communication from spoken word to printed texts to the tweets, the emails, the Facebook pages, the videos and the echoes that all these have in Al Jazeera. My response to your effort is simple: don’t fetishize the network part. What is happening is actually closer to the problematic concept of the multitude than it is to the techno-fetishistic concept of the network. But of course everything happening takes places in the new media environment, of course it has to be analyzed. Let’s move ahead!

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